Unsecured cockpit door focus for NTSB-probe to deadly RV-10 crash

On January 2nd accident was caught on a video surveillance camera across the street from the airport. Sound shared with Los Angeles’ KABC-TV indicated that the kitbuilt aircraft started from KFRF. 14.00 PST from Runway 24 with the pilot and his 16-year-old daughter on board.

According to a preliminary accident report released by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a witness who was an acquaintance with the pilot said, he investigates that he observed the pilot in the left seat of the plane and his daughter in the right seat when they taxed from Their hangar in the southeast corner of the airport towards the Run-Up area in Runway 24.

“Security video footage revealed that the aircraft was in the run-up area for about three minutes, and during that time, even though the left door was in downfall, it wasn’t flush with the hull,” NTSB said.

The RV-10 is equipped with two gull-wing doors on each side of the cabin. The doors are mainly composed of fiberglass and attached to the aircraft with two steel hinges with extension limited by a gas river. The door is attached to the front and back of aluminum’s locking pins that extend into the UHMW -Polyethylene pin mounted on the front and rear pillar structure in the opening of the airmost. The latch pins are connected to the door lock handle using a Rotary gear collection. To lock the door turn the handle forward. This extends the locking pins in the pin blocks. The handle contains a release handle that locks the pins in place when they have reached the fully extended position.

To open the door, the release handle must be pressed. The door includes a secondary safety locking system designed to squeeze the door in the down position if the lock is not manually engaged.

Any non-participated doorway in flight can be surprising, and if the aircraft has seagull doors, there is usually a noticeable change in directional control when the door comes up. Van’s aircraft dealt with this problem in 2010 and added by default in all RV-10-finish sets a secondary door lock and issuing a service balletin that recommended the installation of the secondary lock before additional flights.

Audio recordings provided by FAA confirm that the pilot at. 14:02 called the tower a starting distance.

According to the aircraft’s electronic flight instrument system (EFIS), the pilot initiated the start roll at. 14.07 and reached a height of about 60 feet above the soil surface and a soil speed of approx. 108 knots when it cleared the airport limit.

The aircraft continued to climb and accelerate on track on the road for about 30 seconds, after which the pilot transmitted “immediate landing required” over the frequency of the control tower.

The tower controller asked the pilot if he could turn a left turn and cleared the aircraft for landing on any runway. After a few exchanges, the pilot reported he would return to landing on runway 24.

According to NTSB, the aircraft’s request within 30 seconds of the pilot’s request to return, had completed a 180-degree turning and reached a height of 950 feet MSL, decelerating to 95 knots. The plane went into a left headwind, and approx. 40 seconds later continued to fall as it passed the runway 24 threshold, slowed to 85 knots and went into a left turn.

The tower reported that there was an incomprehensible transmission when the aircraft was at an altitude of 435 feet of MSL and continued in a steep left turn until it collided with the roof of the factory placed 1,500 feet from the approach to the end of the runway 24 .

A witness in the airport ramp south of Runway 24 told investigators he saw the start of the aircraft. When it cleared the end of the runway, he noticed that the left is the door was open and up and he saw an arm reaching up and pulling the door down.

The NTSB report said that several pilot vitner observed the aircraft in the pattern and described it as “flying lower than usual and beating aggressively leaving when it made the transition from wind wind to the base.”

Three witnesses described the left trip to the final as aggressive and were concerned that the plane would stop. The plane then rolled to the right and the nose fell as a piece of the plane described as “panel -like” flowed to the ground. The aircraft – still in a steep width – rose into the building and exploded.

During the study, NTSB learned that the pilot for the aircraft received the primary components of the kit in 2007 and 2008 and completed Airframe in 2011. He received the secondary door lock in January 2010, but study of the wreck showed that the pilot did not install it.

In addition, investigators decided that the pilot had made a number of changes to the standard door locking system, “including the use of fixed steel lock pins rather than the kit-delivered aluminum pins along with replacement of UHMW polytthen door blocks with peeled aluminum blocks.”

NTSB said the main components of the aircraft – including Flykrop, Forward Cabin and both wings – were found at the crash site inside the building. The left door was “found on the roof of the building about 150 meters southeast of the impact point and directly under the flight road of the aircraft,” the report said.

According to NTSB, the door was pulled away from its roof hinges and the door handle was found just below the front closed and locked position. Because it wasn’t quite forward, its lock button wasn’t engaged.

Investigators said the locking pins were found extended about half an inch out the door. When the door handle was tested by moving it forward, the pins stretched longer and the lock button was involved.

In addition, NTSB decided that the door -lock indicator system supplied with the kit consisting of four magnetic pipe switches mounted individually within each door column was not installed. The contacts were configured to confirm via LED warning lamps on the dashboard that each doorpiece was in the fully extended and locked position.

“On the accident plane, it seemed that only two pipe switches were installed, with each mounted on the rear columns on both doors,” NTSB said. “As such, the modified system would not have warned the pilot if the front locking pins had failed to engage fully.”